50: Chapter L.
<< 49: Chapter XLIX. || 51: Chapter LI. >>
Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved
out from its position north Rapidan, to start upon that
memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the
Confederate capital and the army defending it. This was not to
be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the
world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a
week, a month, single season. The losses inflicted, and
endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now
confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a
period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death
from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any
real progress accomplishing the final end. It is true the
Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed
this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly
proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York,
and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do
so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast
good—too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North.
They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one
occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was
destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given
time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be
limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been
anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to
have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been
confronting each other so long, without any decisive result,
that they hardly knew which could whip.
Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were
taken in wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and
butchered as wanted. Three days rations in addition, in
haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the
person of each soldier.
The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan
to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by
numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The
crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not
far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle
to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not
appear in opposition. The country roads were narrow and poor.
Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places,
like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost
impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All
bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came
The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one
cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock,
G. K. Warren, 27 John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The
artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was
in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to
advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass
through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did
so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of
the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.
The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the
right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one
division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General
Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was
nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's line. Hancock, with
the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon
Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg's
division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert's
division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time,
to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and
getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings
before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away,
and by six o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the
crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a
surprise to Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed
Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton,
guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control
of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed.
He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving
notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him
a little after one P.M. giving the information that our crossing
had been successful.
The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,
particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field
from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from
the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character.
There were some clearings and small farms within what might be
termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered
with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the
conditions were favorable for defensive operations.
There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running
from Orange Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly
of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the
northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from
east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House,
one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich's; the western
branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the
Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes by Gates's,
thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford
through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous
roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as
to connect the farms with roads going there.
Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to
Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described
running nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him
unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his
forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Germania
Ford in the Wilderness.
As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry
pushed forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to
Parker's store, on the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left
towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached
the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and
intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river
and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by
sundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren
and camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the
troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than
four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.
There never was a corps better organized than was the
quartermaster's corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With
a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to
Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the
teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry
only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations,
besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties,
the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on
each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the
number of the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to
which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also
marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for
artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if
rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or
whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed to follow
the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would
return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same
article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged
to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army
they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they
belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night
in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the
supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed
theirs at the depots.
I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in
motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in
advance of Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for
the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.
Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut
down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point
possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road
from Culpeper to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and
overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks;
an improvidence I had never witnessed before.
Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at
a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the
Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until
about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would
confront his army. This I judge from the fact that at 1.15
P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old
Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which,
when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to
occupy their intrenchments at Mine Run.
Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman,
Butler and Crook had moved according to programme.
On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee
ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to
move to the right to attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road,
Longstreet to follow on the same road. Longstreet was at this
time—middle of the afternoon—at Gordonsville, twenty or more
miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was near
by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before
bivouacking for the night.
My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance
on the morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's
store, and Wilson's cavalry—then at Parker's store—to move on
to Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in
on his right. The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west,
though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the
enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of
Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.
At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren
discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was
ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with
his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he
could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty with his
division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly
by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was the speediest
way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both
the Orange plank and turnpike roads.
Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that
the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By
making a night march, although some of his troops had to march
forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of
his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his
headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of
the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I
remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in
position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command,
and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the
proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to
see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where
It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take
the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his
intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had
not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he
discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage
of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon
as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered
to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the
rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards
until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked
with favorable though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat
isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a
time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south,
and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two o'clock
Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and
narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack
as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. At
four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and General
Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack
whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth
within a few hundred yards.
Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and
Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the
support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the
battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the
field. One of Birney's most gallant brigade commanders
—Alexander Hays—was killed.
I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had
served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time
in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to
lead his command wherever ordered. With him it was "Come,
boys," not "Go."
Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division
were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the
intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march
upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night,
and bivouacked where they were without getting into position.
During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry
to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He
found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser,
supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they
were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and
themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry
back beyond Corbin's Bridge.
Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a
close to it. Neither side made any special progress.
After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were
given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000
men was on his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and
might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels
should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore
ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. Meade asked
to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far
as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as
the hour to move.
Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac.
Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before,
lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the
right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and
to attack Hill's left.
Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to
get in between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he
could get in position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to
make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as
they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce
Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered if he should
succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the
left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock was informed
of all the movements ordered.
Burnside had three divisions, but one of them—a colored
division—was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see
it again until July.
Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on
his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact
that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the
assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and
to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault
on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed.
Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in
time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the
Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division
of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery,
to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This
disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock
moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the
right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when
the enemy began to break up in great confusion.
I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now,
that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command
could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the
enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that
Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond
Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but
was not able to accomplish much.
On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with
Hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to
get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the
Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them
at both places. Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was
Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and
thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced
his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another
incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to
weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were
seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and
Brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the
troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents
coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced
upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was
ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to
continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of
his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the
dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be
of any service on the forenoon of the sixth.
Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a
mile or more. He maintained this position until, along in the
afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of
Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged,
became encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled,
from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred
yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a
brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it
away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and
soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great
confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced
position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the
position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly
intrenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth while
trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the
hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no
The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet
seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave
the field, not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a
severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the
mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during
After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of
his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men
to attack Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the
purpose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front
of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's
commands. This brigade having been formed at right angles to
the intrenchments held by Hancock's command, swept down the
whole length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy
was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared
without a contest.
Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside
had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But
it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting
into position on Hancock's right.
At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved
up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire.
This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part
of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave
way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson
took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting
their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But
owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double
quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting
great loss. Fighting had continued from five in the morning
sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places.
The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged
three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of the severely
wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the
bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who
had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or
burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our
breastworks, in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned
with great fury. But the battle still raged, our men firing
through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.
Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his
personal efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however,
were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of
his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His
troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had
given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because
his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time
to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.
Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during
all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to
prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in
I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to
be taken up except one at Germania Ford.
The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to in force our
left. This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of
being cut off from all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had
refused his right and intrenched it for protection against
attack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out
from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's
right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created
considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence,
however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown
into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says
in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his
lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great
discomfort. Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early,
continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had
rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of
the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.
During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their
intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove
the enemy's cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern.
Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find
the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half
before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of
his Works. There was no battle during the day, and but little
firing except in Warren's front; he being directed about noon to
make a reconnaissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but
there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This
ended the Battle of the Wilderness.
Union Army on the Rapidan, May 5, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General George G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock, commanding Second Army Corps.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
- First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
- Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
- Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
- Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
- Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
- Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.
Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
- Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.
Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
- First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
- Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.
Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.
Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, commanding Fifth Army Corps.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
- Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
- Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
- First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
- Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
- Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
- First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
- Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.
Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
- Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
- Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone
Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.
Maj.-Gen. John Sedwick, commanding Sixth Army Corps.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
- First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
- Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
- Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
- Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
- Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
- Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
- Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
- Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.
Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins
Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
- Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
- Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
- First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
- Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
- First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
- Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.
Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside, commanding Ninth Army Corps.
First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
- First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
- Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.
Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
- First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
- Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin
Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
- First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
- Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.
Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
- First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
- Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.
- Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.
Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery.
Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
- First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
- Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
- First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
- Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
- Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.
General Headquarters....... Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.
Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by General Robert E. Lee, August
First Army Corps: Lieut.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding.
Maj.-Gen. Geo. E. Pickett's Division.
Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade.
(a) Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's " " Eppa Hunton's " " Wm. R. Terry's "
Maj.-Gen. C. W. Field's Division.
(b) Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade " E. M. Law's
(c) " " John Bratton's "
Maj.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw's Division.
(d) Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade " B. G. Humphreys' " " Goode Bryan's " " Kershaw's
Second Army Corps: Major-General Jubal A. Early, Commanding
Maj.-Gen. John B. Gordon's Division. Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade.
(e) " John Pegram 's "
(f) " Gordon's "
(g) Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's "
Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's Division. Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker).
(h) Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade.
(h) " Geo H. Stewart's "
(h) " L. A. Stafford's "
Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes' Division. Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade.
(I) " Geo. Dole's "
(k) " S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. " C. A. Battle's " " R. D. Johnston's " (f)
Third Army Corps: Lieut.-Gen. A. P. HILL, Commanding.
Maj.-Gen. WM. Mahone's Division.
(l) Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade. Mahone's " Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's "
(m) " A. R. Wright's " " Joseph Finegan's "
Maj.-Gen. C. M. Wilcox's Division. Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n) " James H. Lane's " "
Sam'l McCowan's " " Alfred M. Scale's "
Maj.-Gen. H. Heth's Division. (o) Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. " John R. Cooke's " " D.
McRae's " " J. J. Archer's " " H. H. Walker's "
_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.
Cavalry Corps: Lieutenant-General Wade Hampton, Commanding.(p)
Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's Division Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade " L. L. Lomax's "
Maj.-Gen. M. C. Butler's Division. Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade. " P. M. B. Young's " "
Thomas L. Rosser's "
Maj.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee's Division. Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade. " J. R. Chambliss's "
Artillery Reserve: Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton's, Commanding.
Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander's Division.* Cabell's Battalion. Manly's Battery. 1st Co. Richmond
Howitzers. Carleton's Battery. Calloway's Battery.
Haskell's Battalion. Branch's Battery. Nelson's " Garden's " Rowan "
Huger's Battalion. Smith's Battery. Moody " Woolfolk " Parker's " Taylor's " Fickling's " Martin's
Gibb's Battalion. Davidson's Battery. Dickenson's " Otey's "
Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long's Division.
Braxton's Battalion. Lee Battery. 1st Md. Artillery. Stafford " Alleghany "
Cutshaw's Battalion. Charlotteville Artillery. Staunton " Courtney "
Carter's Battalion. Morris Artillery. Orange " King William Artillery. Jeff Davis "
Nelson's Battalion. Amherst Artillery. Milledge " Fluvauna "
Brown's Battalion. Powhatan Artillery. 2d Richmond Howitzers. 3d " " Rockbridge Artillery.
Salem Flying Artillery.
Col R. L.Walker's Division.
Cutt's Battalion. Ross's Battery. Patterson's Battery. Irwin Artillery.
Richardson's Battalion. Lewis Artillery. Donaldsonville Artillery. Norfolk Light " Huger "
Mclntosh 's Battalion. Johnson's Battery. Hardaway Artillery. Danville " 2d Rockbridge Artillery.
Pegram's Battalion. Peedee Artillery. Fredericksburg Artillery. Letcher " Purcell Battery.
Poague's Battalion. Madison Artillery. Albemarle " Brooke " Charlotte "
(a) Col. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. ©) Commanded by
Colonel P. D. Bowles.
(d) Only two brigadier-Generals reported for duty; names not
Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
(e) Constituting York's Brigade.
(f) In Ramseur's Division.
(g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
(I) Grimes' Brigade.
(k) Cook's "
(l) Returns report but one General officer present for duty;
name not indicated.
(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
brigadier-Generals reported present for duty; names not
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.
*But one General officer reported present for duty in the
artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.
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