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11: Attempts at the Restoration of King Charles in 1921

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Attempts at the Restoration of King Charles in 1921

Easter Sunday, which fell on March 27th, was a day of brilliant sunshine. The trees were in blossom and amid burgeoning nature the whole of Hungary. Town and country was celebrating the resurrection of Our Lord, grateful that the signs of better times were visibly multiplying. On the insistence of my wife, I had at last decided to take a day's holiday with my family, the first for a considerable time. In the morning, we had given the children their Easter eggs and small gifts had been handed out to the members of the household. We were sitting down to our midday meal when my aide-de-camp, Major Magasházy, entered with the message that Count Sigray(1) had arrived and was waiting for me with an important communication. I rose from the table and went to receive Count Sigray, the Government Commissioner for western Hungary.

We had hardly finished exchanging greetings before he disclosed to me that His Majesty King Charles was in Budapest and was awaiting me in the Prime Minister's residence. It was plain to me that His Majesty's return must have the worst consequences for Hungary, and I asked Sigray if he were in any way responsible for it. He denied this.

The King, he told me, had arrived late the previous night and totally unexpectedly at the palace of Bishop Count Mikes(2) at Szombathely after having called on Count Thomas Erdôdy(3) in Vienna on Good Friday in the company of his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Parma(4). Count Erdôdy had put his car at the King's disposal for the journey to the frontier. He had not known that His Majesty had left Switzerland, nor had he heard the slightest rumour of his intention to do so. He had been overcome by surprise when an unnamed visitor had been announced who, on removing his motoring goggles, had disclosed himself as the King. Not even Count Joseph Hunyady(5), the Steward of the Household and confidant of His Majesty, had been consulted or even informed. At Szombathely, Sigray went on, His Majesty had received the homage of the Bishop and of the leading churchmen who had assembled there for the Easter festival. He had, moreover, conferred with the Prime Minister, Count Paul Teleki, who chanced to be in the neighbourhood as he was staying as a guest at the castle of Count Sigray. Sigray himself had been present at that interview, and Teleki told me later, when he had accepted full responsibility for the course that events took and had handed in his resignation, that he had done what he could to dissuade the King from taking the step he was contemplating, expressing his opinion by the simple statement, "Too soon." But his words had no effect. He had been instructed to go to Budapest in advance and inform me that the King was arriving. As he had travelled by a different route and his car had broken down on the way, he had not reached Budapest before the King.

I told Count Sigray to go at once, with my aide-de-camp, to the Cabinet Chamber and ask His Majesty to come to the Palace. I did not have to reflect very long what I should say to him. This self-sought situation had only one solution: the King must return to Switzerland without delay. Six months before, on the occasion of the unveiling of a commemorative plaque at Sopron, I had made my attitude towards the Crown and the monarch very clear.

"We all," I had said, "would like to see the Crown of St. Stephen resplendent in its former glory. But before this restoration can be achieved, immense tasks of external and internal consolidation must be performed. Anyone who at the present juncture brings the question of the restoration of the monarchy to the fore will be doing a disservice to the peace of the country, will be hampering reconstruction and will be putting obstacles in the way of our resumption of relations with foreign powers."

This meant, and in those days I frequently stressed this point when discussing affairs with foreign diplomats, that I and the members of the government considered a return of His Majesty to the Hungarian throne the concern of Hungary alone. In any case, the Habsburg question had not been touched upon in the Treaty of Trianon. To have a certain right and to possess the means of exercising that right are, however, two different matters. In Paris, there was still an Ambassadorial Conference of the victorious powers claiming full competence in dealing with all questions concerning Hungary, Austria and Germany, the question of German reparations, for instance, and having the coercive means at its disposal with which to enforce its decisions. Its representatives in Budapest were the British and French High Commissioners and the Italian chargé d'affaires as well as a Military Mission. On February 2nd, 1920, this Ambassadorial Conference had issued a formal veto against a restoration of the Habsburgs in Hungary, as such a restoration would in its view "rock peace to its foundations" and it could therefore "neither be recognized nor tolerated" by the Allies.

This attitude, far from being modified at a later date, was instead confirmed. On January 3rd, 1921, Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, in the course of a long discussion with our diplomatic representative in Rome, Count Nemes(6), on the question of Italy's attitude should a Habsburg return to the throne, had exclaimed, "L'Empereur Charles, jamais!" For Italy feared that the return of a Habsburg would menace her possession of Trieste and the South Tirol and she had therefore undertaken, in the Treaty of Rapallo (November 3rd, 1920) with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to do everything within her power "to oppose the return of the House of Habsburg to the Hungarian throne". In the course of a visit made by Edvard Benes, the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, to Rome in the early days of February, 1921, this had been further emphasized when he declared that a return of the Habsburgs would be considered a casus belli. Finally, the Ambassadorial Conference itself had reiterated its declaration of February 2nd, 1920, on February 16th of the following year, a few weeks before the return of His Majesty to Hungary.

I had all this clearly in mind as I awaited the King. Had these facts not been put before him by his advisers? Our discussion soon gave me the answer to that question.

I did not have to wait long before His Majesty was announced. He had walked the short distance to the Palace. We had not met since the fateful day, two and a half years previously, when I had had the painful duty of informing His Majesty at Schönbrunn of the surrender of the fleet in accordance with my instructions and of asking him to accept my resignation as Commander-in-Chief. On that occasion, as on all others, His Majesty had displayed his kindly disposition towards me; now as I prepared to conduct him from the aides-de-camp room to my study, he flung his arms round me.

King Charles, wearing a Hungarian officer's uniform, expressed the hope that he could once more take his place as head of the state. He gave me a graphic account of his life in exile.

I assured His Majesty that, were I able to recall him, our crowned King, whose legitimate claims I recognized and was prepared to defend, it would be the happiest termination of my present office.

In Hungary, I told him, his estates had been left unsequestrated and the income deriving from them was at his disposal. Although my petition to the heads of the victorious states asking that the Succession States should contribute to the grant to His Majesty in proportion to their size and population had borne no fruit. I begged him to believe that I still felt myself bound by the oath I had sworn to the Emperor and that I had no wish whatsoever to retain my office as Regent. "But Your Majesty should consider," I continued, "that the very moment I hand the reins of state over to the King, the armies of the neighbouring states will cross our frontiers. We have nothing with which to oppose them in the field. Your Majesty will then be forced to return to Switzerland, Hungary will be occupied by foreign troops and the evil resulting from renewed occupation will be incalculable."

The effects of the Rumanian occupation were still fresh in my memory. I wished to convince His Majesty that the menace of a renewed occupation was not imaginary. At the time I am writing this(7), the world has an aspect very different from the one it wore in 1921, and the peoples of Austria-Hungary would no doubt prefer the two-headed eagle to the hammer and sickle. But at that Easter time of 1921, the tide of nationalism was running high in our neighbour states. Their governments would not have permitted a restoration of the Habsburg symbols. These were considerations that the Great Powers had to bear in mind. For it must be remembered, that they themselves caused the partition of the Austro-Hungarian empire on purpose, to the subsequent misfortune of Europe and the world.

As I was explaining the attitude of the Great Powers, the King interrupted me to tell me that he had come with the knowledge and approval of the Entente. To my courteous request for more details, he mentioned the name of Briand(8), who at that time was the French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"Has Your Majesty had a personal conversation with Briand?"

"No. I have been in touch with him only through intermediaries."

The intermediary turned out to be the brother of the Empress Zita, Prince Sixtus of Parma, who had close contact with French royalist circles, but these did not represent the French Government.

I could not doubt for one moment that His Majesty was speaking in good faith when he declared that his return had the approval of France at any rate. I do not consider that it was out of the question that a certain encouragement may have been given him from Paris. I had a vivid memory of some half-promises and vague assurances concerning the relaxation of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon which were made when it was likely that Hungary would have to lend support to Poland when that country had been invaded during the summer of the previous year by the Bolshevist Russian armies. After the Battle of the Vistula, in which Hungarian munitions played an important part, the threat to Poland receded, and Paris promptly lost interest in Hungary. That Colonel Strutt, the British confidant of King Charles and his companion at Eckartsau, had sent him a telegram in code in mid-March to advise him against an attempt at regaining his throne, was a detail that I was to hear a few days later from Masirevic(9), our diplomatic representative in Vienna.

To clarify the situation, I proposed to His Majesty that Briand should be asked, through the French High Commissioner in Budapest, whether he would be prepared to guarantee Hungary French support in the name of the Allies should the Succession States turn on what was left of our country. His Majesty agreed to this proposal and also acceded to my request that he should return to the Bishop's palace at Szombathely to await the reply from Paris.

"Should Briand accept the responsibility, I shall gladly restore your hereditary rights to Your Majesty," I declared. "Should the answer be unfavourable, I shall have to beg Your Majesty to leave the country immediately before your presence here becomes generally known."

Attempts have since been made to place this two-hour discussion between His Majesty and myself in a false light. As I held then and still hold today, it was a discussion on the outcome of which depended the very existence of our Fatherland. I must add that, before he departed, His Majesty expressed his profound thanks to me and invested me with the Grand Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa, creating me Duke of Otranto and Szeged. And I must add further that I have neither worn the Grand Cross nor used the ducal title. This gesture of His Majesty, however, shows better than words that he, at any rate, was convinced of my good faith and that my attitude sprang from my sense of responsibility and duty.

I begged King Charles to retain his confidence in me and, with regard to Hungary, to undertake nothing without consulting me lest he should create new difficulties for our country or endanger his own return to the throne at some future time.

While King Charles, accompanied by Major Magasházy, returned by car to Szombathely, the Ministers assembled, and to them I gave a succinct report of the situation. All who had seen the King were sworn to secrecy.

Meanwhile, I had called M. Maurice Fouchet, the French diplomatic representative, to the Palace to transmit through him His Majesty's request to Briand. The answer was a definite denial. Briand emphatically declared that at no time had he expressed his agreement to the return of King Charles to the throne of Hungary. Whether or not this was true, and later I learned that Prince Sixtus had conferred with several French Generals, including Lyautey,(10) and that M. Berthélot(11), the General Secretary of the Quai d'Orsay, perturbed about a possible union of Germany and Austria, had played an ambiguous part. Briand's answer, publicized later in the press, did at any rate represent the official attitude of the French Government. I informed His Majesty over the Hughes apparatus, a special telephone on which conversations cannot be overheard, and asked him to leave the country as quickly as possible. Koloman Kánya(12), the Foreign Minister's deputy, informed him in person of the content of the Paris answer and of the various protests of the Great Powers and of our neighbours. As King Charles had caught a cold which necessitated his staying in bed for a few days, his departure was delayed until April 5th. We had obtained from Berne permission for his re-entry into Switzerland, and Vienna had given us the assurance that his journey through Austria would be smooth and in keeping with his dignity. However, though His Majesty was escorted by Allied officers and Austrian security personnel, there were regrettable Socialist-Communist demonstrations at Bruck-an-der-Mur.

That my attitude was justified was soon made clear. My first callers on Easter Monday were the High Commissioners of England and France, who came to stress the "categorical opposition" of their governments to any attempt at a restoration. Shortly afterwards, the Italian chargé d'affaires arrived to declare that the prevention of a Habsburg restoration was "a cardinal point of Italy's foreign policy". On the Tuesday morning, I received the Yugoslav representative, who declared that the return of His Majesty would be regarded as a definite casus belli. The protest of the Rumanian representative was not quite so violent, as Queen Marie(13) of Rumania had not been altogether a stranger to King Charles's plan. Benes, as he told our diplomat Count László Szapáry(14), put the attempted restoration to good use, for shortly afterwards, on April 23rd, 1921, he was able to conclude a military anti-Hungarian alliance between Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

Benes's representative in Budapest made almost daily appearances at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to threaten reprisals should the King prolong his stay on Hungarian territory. The final demarche was made collectively by the Great Powers. Their representatives, upon instructions of the Allied Ambassadorial Conference in Paris, delivered a joint Note which referred to the declaration of February 2nd, 1920, and called attention to the "serious consequences" that would follow should the Hungarian Government not take active measures to prevent any attempts at restoration.

I hope that this statement will counterbalance the many incorrect versions of the incidents of those memorable Easter days.

The royal question was once more to cause excitement in Hungary and abroad in that same year, 1921. Again I received no warning, though I was in regular communication with His Majesty. From his despatches, I augured that his information, particularly on personal matters, was inadequate and that he was therefore insufficiently aware of the true state of affairs. I decided at last to send a confidential envoy known personally to His Majesty to Hertenstein Castle, to which King Charles had moved in April. Unfortunately, my choice turned out to be an unsuitable one. From what motives I do not know, Boroviczény(15), married to one of the ladies-in-waiting of the Queen, gave the King bad advice instead of giving him a true picture of actual conditions. I could not have foreseen this, for in his former capacity of secretary to my friend General Sarkotic(16), the government's representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had come to look upon him as an intelligent young man. Later, he had become the assistant of the liaison officer of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Court. Boroviczény, Count Sigray, who in March had informed me of the King's arrival, and Colonel Baron Lehár(17), a brother of the world-famous composer, played an important part, as far as my knowledge goes, in the inauspicious second attempt at restoration(18). The leaders of the Legitimists, to use a term that makes a fundamentally false distinction between their attitude and mine. Whereas we differed only in the method by which the restoration was to be brought about, in my opinion men such as Count Julius Andrássy(19), the last of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers, Gustav Gratz(20), the former Hungarian Foreign Minister, and others were not involved in the preparations. It had been made very clear on August 22nd, at a conference held under my chairmanship, that a return of the King could occur only in conditions of domestic and foreign security. The crowned King is the King of all Hungarians; he could only be recalled by representatives of all Hungarians and not by a minority group. Above all, the person of the King could not be made the centre of a hazardous coup de main.

The first information reached me on October 21st: telephone and telegraph communications with Sopron were found to be cut. The reason for this appeared later when I heard that His Majesty and the Queen had arrived by plane the day before at Count Cziráky's(21) estate at Dénesfa. This place had been chosen apparently because there was, on account of coming elections, a relatively strong party of state police there who were under the orders of Colonel Lehár and of Major Ostenburg at Sopron itself. Ostenburg obeyed the orders of Lehár, his men swore an oath of loyalty to the King, and joined His Majesty on the train which was to take him to Budapest. Their idea that the King's presence in the country could be kept secret until he entered the capital was a mistaken one. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been informed of his movements by an agent stationed at Hertenstein. The other powers heard of his arrival at Dénesfa from their military missions then located at Sopron. Simultaneously with the first news of the King's presence came the first protests of the Great Powers and the Little Entente. Belgrade had immediately called up three classes of reservists, and Rumania was preparing partial mobilization. Benes sent telegrams to the various Czech legations declaring that the presence of the ex-Emperor on Hungarian soil was a casus belli. Great Britain informed our Prime Minister, Count Bethlen, through the High Commissioner, Thomas Hohler(22), that the British Government set its face against any attempt at a coup d'etat and would therefore do nothing to exert a restraining influence on the Little Entente. If the Hungarian Government was not in a position to keep order within its own frontiers, energetic measures would have to be taken from abroad. The joint Note presented by the British, French and Italian diplomats reiterated the text of the Note of April 3rd and also demanded an unambiguous statement from the Hungarian Government that it should "without delay take the necessary measures once more to remove the King from Hungarian territory".

To emphasize the seriousness of the Note, the three Ministers called not only on the Prime Minister, but also on me. Hardly had they left before the Ministers of the Little Entente called to inform me that their troops would cross the frontier should His Majesty resume power.

Count Bethlen, who, by a remarkable coincidence, had chanced to make an important speech at Pécs on the very day His Majesty had, unknown to the Prime Minister, set foot on Hungarian soil. In this he emphasized the legitimistic views of the government and, while condemned every attempt at dethronement, yet insisted on the Hungarian right to determine the day on which the King should return to his country. Bethlen considered the situation to be as serious as I did. It was not because Stephen Rakovszky, the President of the Hungarian Parliament, the man appointed by the King as chief of the Counter-Government, threatened him, during a telephone conversation, with the gallows if the King were not well received in Budapest. "This is terrible!" Bethlen exclaimed as he replaced the receiver. It was because he realized that the advisers of the King were aiming at an armed conflict to achieve their ends. Indeed that is what developed.

Caught in this tragic situation, I tried to persuade the King to relinquish his scheme. I wrote him the following letter, to which I appended the Anglo-Franco-Italian Note.

"Budapest, October 22nd, 1921.

Your Majesty!

In the utmost distress of mind, but moved by the oppressive weight of my anxiety, I must beg Your Majesty to abandon your advance to the capital at the head of armed forces. The situation has in no way altered since the spring when Your Majesty left the country.

The conditions which then prompted me and Your Majesty's trusted advisers, who, like myself, have the welfare of Hungary at heart, to beg you to leave the country, still prevail in a yet more em>aggravated form. The position at the moment is even more precarious. In the spring, the arrival em>of Your Majesty took not only this country but also the foreign powers by surprise. Since then, it is seen that preparations have been made against such a possibility. This is evident from the fact that the protests we received in the spring came only after a lapse of days, whereas on this occasion they have been handed to the government immediately and are couched in far stronger terms, the Little Entente openly threatening invasion. From our point of view, power relations have deteriorated. We are threatened on three sides by an enemy we cannot possibly subdue. But even should we attempt the impossible, even should our nations succeed in holding up the enemy, it would be at the cost of the devastation of large tracts of our land. The distress arising from such devastation would be exacerbated by the hardships of winter, and together these would be the sure ally of Bolshevism. An earnest survey of the situation assures us that such a menace would arise even sooner, for it is certain that an enemy advance would foster bitterness and anarchy.

The temper of the majority of the people is such that Your Majesty would not have the country behind him, and the prevention of civil war would not be within my power.

Should Your Majesty proceed towards Budapest with armed forces, our fate is certain and within a few days our country would be under foreign domination.

Should Your Majesty wish to verify the facts with the representatives of the Allies, with me or with my Ministers, no difficulties will be put in your way. Your Majesty can, with a small retinue, cover the short distance that separates us in complete safety. I have always tried to carry out my duty with selflessness. Today it is my duty to inform you that, should Your Majesty enter Budapest with armed forces, Hungary will cease to exist forever.

With profound respect,


I gave this letter to Bishop Vass(23), the Minister of Social Welfare, who was in His Majesty's favour on account of his behaviour at Easter. I sent with him Lieutenant-Colonel Ottrubay(24), a former attaché at the Austro-Hungarian Military Chancellery. These two men met the royal train at Komárom, but were not admitted to His Majesty's presence. For reasons for which he alone was responsible, the King's Prime Minister designate, Rakovszky, omitted to deliver my letter to His Majesty. A few days later, Rakovszky drew it unopened from his pocket in the presence of Count Julius Andrássy, Count Francis Esterházy(25) and Baroness Fiath, the President of the Hungarian Red Cross. Whether His Majesty would have acted differently had he received my letter, none can say.

That night, I issued the necessary military orders to prevent by force of arms that which force of arms sought to achieve. I need not go into my feelings. Naturally I wondered whether I ought to withdraw from the whole ghastly conflict by resigning office. But, faced by the destruction of the Fatherland, it would have been cowardice on my part to evade the issue. Bethlen, the Prime Minister, emphatically supported my views.

Meanwhile, the train bearing the royal pair, which had been repeatedly delayed by torn-up tracks, had reached Biatorbágy, not far from Budapest. His Majesty's demand that the government should submit unconditionally to him and the determination of the government to resist a coup d'etat were in conflict. To my profound grief, the order to open fire had to be given. The miserable gendarmes, simple Magyar peasants' sons, who had been trained all their lives to passive obedience, were the victims.(26)

I sent Colonel Shvoy(27) to parley and to request the King to come to Budapest for negotiations under guarantee of personal safety. Upon the insistence of his advisers, the King rejected this proposal. My second proposal, that government representatives and responsible advisers of the King should meet the following morning and that until then there should be a truce, was accepted.

These discussions between the Minister Kánya and General E. Sárkány(28) on the one side and Colonel Lehár and Gratz on the other proved fruitless. Though the government troops had meanwhile been reinforced, and though the officers who had sworn allegiance to the King at Gyôr and Komárom begged to be released from their oath on the grounds that they had been deceived, the King was urged to press on, regardless of consequences.

Yet His Majesty came to a different decision. He turned westward. The sight of the killed and injured must have brought him to his senses and made him realize that a civil war was starting. His Majesty was averse to the thought of bloodshed, for he was a man of a kindly and noble disposition. He and the Queen accepted the invitation of Count Esterházy to stay at his castle at Tata.

My Ministers and I were left with the task of ensuring the personal safety of His Majesty. We thought the safest place for his temporary sojourn would be the Benedictine Abbey of Tihany, situated on a peninsula of Lake Balaton. A number of political negotiations were held there and it was proposed to the King, in order to circumvent the probability that he would be deposed by foreign powers. Indeed, Hungary was forced to pass a law enacting the dethronement of the King, that he should abdicate in favour of his nine-year-old son, Archduke Otto. Though this proposal was advocated in person by the Prince Primate Cardinal Csernoch, it was rejected.

In the end, the decision of the Allies was received: His Majesty was to leave Hungary in the British monitor Glow-worm. So it came to pass. In the Black Sea, the King and his retinue were transferred to another ship which took them to Funchal in Madeira. There His Majesty, surrounded by his mourning family, died on April 1st, 1922.

My attitude during the two attempts at restoration has been the subject of frequent attack. Critics have invariably ignored the fact that on neither occasion did I act as a tyrannical rebel. Both attempts were doomed to failure on account of our unfavourable international position, which was determined by the anti-Habsburg policy of both the Great Powers and the Little Entente. In the face of that policy, Hungary was powerless. Our dependence on the Allies was most plainly manifested in the demand made to us that an Act of Dethronement be passed, an extreme example of foreign interference in the domestic concerns of a state.

To depict the variance of feelings and opinions concerning the monarchic question, I shall narrate an incident which had never hitherto been mentioned, all participants in it having been sworn to secrecy.

In August, 1922, a group of politicians and other leading figures of Hungary, among them a Catholic bishop, came to see me at the castle in the Crown domain of Gödöllô, where we always spent the months of August and September. They had an important proposal to lay before me, they declared, a question about which they had hesitated to approach me. I soon gathered from their spokesman, Count Gedeon Ráday(29), a former Chief Comissioner of a county and Minister for Home Affairs, and, now, Deputy, that after mature consideration they had come to offer me the Crown in the name of all classes of the people. To ensure the country's peace, they said, the struggle for the chief office of state must cease. Some wanted an independent Hungary with the legitimate King, others were for electing Archduke Joseph or Archduke Albert. Elements of the Left were aiming at a republic. "But the majority of the Magyars," Count Ráday declared, "want to live, as Hungarians have done for a thousand years, under the Crown of St. Stephen and a Hungarian dynasty. Accept the crown, your Serene Highness, and at one blow the whole dangerous situation will be resolved."

I was, naturally, extremely astonished and I replied that I fully recognized the difficulties that they had expounded. I thanked them for the confidence in me that their proposal showed, but said that I did not feel able to accede to their request. For what was it that gave me courage and strength to work at the reconstruction of our shattered Fatherland? Only the feeling that, in my status as Regent of the Realm, I could count on the confidence shown a trustworthy and honourable man. Were I to stretch my hand towards the crown, I should cease to be selfless and worthy of respect, and my own brothers would turn against me. Never, not even should a plebiscite be unanimous, would I accept the royal crown.

1. Count Antal Sigray (1879-1947). He died under torture in a Communist prison.

2. Bishop Count János Mikes (1876-1945).

3. Count Tamás Erdôdy (1886-1931), landowner, legitimist (pro-Habsburg) politician.

4. Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma (1886-1934), brother of Queen Zita.

5. Count Joseph Hunyadi (1873-1942).

6. Count Albert Nemes (1866-1940).

7. 1952.

8. Aristide Briand (1862-1932) in 1909 became prime minister of France, a position he occupied ten times. In 1917 he attempted to make peace with Germany, and, after opposition by Clemanceau, he resigned. Later he became a leading advicate of international peace.

9. Szilárd Masirevich (1879-1944), Hungarian diplomat.

10. Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934).

11. Philippe Berthelot (1866-1945), French diplomat.

12. Kálmán Kánya (1869-1945) former Austro-Hungarian diplomat, later foreign minister.

13. Queen Marie, Princess of Saxon-Koburg-Gotha (1875-1938), wife of King Ferdinand.

14. Count László Szapáry (1864-1939).

15. Baron Aladár Boroviczény (1890-1963) legitimist politician.

16. Gen. István Sarkotich (1888-1939) former provincial commissioner of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17. Lt. Gen. Baron Antal Lehár (1876-1962). In retirement, he traveled all over Hungary recruiting Legitimist army officers to the cause.

18. Throughout the summer of 1921 the Legitimists, have made extensive preparations for the return of the king the planned coup d'etat was almost an open secret. (Dombrády L. & Sándor Toth: The royal Hungarian army: 1919-45; Budapest: Zrinyi, 1987, in Hung.)

19. Count Gyula Andrássy Jr. (1860-1929), son of the former prime minister.

20. Gusztáv Gratz (1875-1946), economist, politician.

21. Count József Cziráky (1883-1960).

22. Sir Thomas Beaumont Hohler (1871-1946), British diplomat.

23. József Vass (1877-1930), Catholic priest, politician.

24. Staff-Colonel Károly Ottrubay.

25. Count Ferenc Esterházy (1896-1939), composer, politician.

26. Some of the forces resisting the King's return were the armed students of the Technical University, who were raised by Gyula Gömbös.

27. Kálmán Shvoy (1881-1971), his memoirs was one of the first published on this era.

28. Maj. Gen. Jenô Sárkány (1869- ?), commander of the Budapest military district.

29. Count Gedeon Ráday (1872-1937).

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