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By Jeff Howell
Like a shooting star flashing across the heavens, Pancho Villa burned his way into the
Mexican consciousness during the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920. To many on both sides
of the border, Villa's exploits made him a Robin Hood figure, an avenger of the poor, a righter of
wrongs. Others viewed him as nothing more than a bloodthirsty bandit, driven by greed and an
insatiable desire for violence. Yet to this day, many in Mexico consider Villa a patriot and a hero
of the Mexican Revolution, seeing in him the personification of the spirit of the Mexican masses,
yearning for freedom and a better standard of living.
This paper seeks to evaluate the images of Villa. The questions that drove this research were, "Why was Villa seen in such contradictory images?" Can any one viewpoint encapsulate Villa? Was Pancho Villa much worse than his contemporaries during the Revolution in regards to bloodshed?
The conclusion drawn from a survey of secondary sources is that Villa produced contradictory reactions in people because his life was filled with contradictions. He wanted to give Mexicans more freedom yet he ruled like the autocrat Porfirio Diáz. He believed education could solve the problems of Mexico, yet achieved his goals with the barrel of a gun. He loved children but could kill an enemy in the blink of an eye. The populace in northern Mexico hailed Villa as a hero, yet he never woke up in the place he initially bedded down in. Many love him, but he trusted no one. The violent times in which he lived marked Villa, and though he sought to improve Mexico, in the end his goals exceeded his grasp.
To understand the motivations of Villa, one must understand the context in which he lived. By 1876, Mexico came under the sway of Cinco de Mayo hero Porfirio Diáz. Under Diáz's regime (1876-1910), Mexico progressed economically and industrially. Foreign investment came into Mexico. Yet, Diáz's measures tended to serve only the elite and further impoverished the peon class. Under Diáz, Mexico retrogressed socially. To keep the support of the obscenely wealthy hacendados, Diáz allowed these landed gentry to begin a program of massive land expropriation.1 The hacendados stripped the local villages, ejidos, of their holdings. Much of the land and its natural resources (copper, silver, oil), as well as the railroads, was owned and exploited by foreign investors.2 By 1910, almost half of Mexico was owned by less than three thousand families.3
Into this web of tyranny came Doroteo Arango, born in 1878. Doroteo's father and mother, Augustín and Micaela, were poor people living in the northern state of Durango. They worked on the El Gorgojito ranch, owned by the López Negrete clan. Augustín was the illegitimate son of Jésus Villa. When his father died, young Doroteo found himself the man of the house, forced to provide for four younger siblings.4 This is where the Villa legend begins.
Historians are divided over the actual events that occurred in 1894. The story goes that Doroteo, age 16, shot Agustín López Negrete for trying to rape Doroteo's sister Martina. Surprisingly, Negrete did not order Doroteo arrested or killed. Villa scholar, Friedrich Katz, questioned this train of events because when Doroteo, now Francisco Villa, was arrested in 1898, the charges brought were mule and gun theft, not the attempted murder of a wealthy hacendado. For whatever reason, Doroteo took to the outlaw life by 1894.5 He changed his name to Francisco Villa. The surname may have been in honor of his grandfather.
Historians have pointed out that the choices for peons in northern Mexico were severely limited. Villa may have been running from the repercussions of his violent act against Negrete, or he may have decided that the outlaw life was the only way to survive. By the time young Doroteo became Pancho Villa, the wealthy Terrazas-Creel clan dominated northern Mexico. Luis Terrazas and his nephew and son-in-law, Enrique Creel, owned enough acreage to be the size of Costa Rica as well as cattle, banks, and railroads. peons were left with the choice of being virtual slaves of the hacendados, with little recourse of protest, or starve.6
Also, northern Mexico was steeped in a tradition of violence. This area served as the frontier, the buffer zone between the marauding Apaches and central Mexico. Mexicans had lived in military colonies in this area, and learned to fight in order to survive. Two centuries of fighting Indians had produced in these Mexicans a sense of independence.7 They did not mind the modernization that the Porfiriato brought to Mexico, they protested that the modernization came at the loss of their own economic and political freedom while padding the pockets of foreigners and the hacendados.8
Peons were expected to accept these oppressive conditions. The Rurales, or rural police, loosely defined what made a criminal. A peon who protested or ran away could be executed under the ley fuga, the law of flight. Unruly peons could face impressment into the army.9 Looking at the backdrop of the oppression and poverty that pervaded the lives of Mexican peons, it becomes easier to understand why young Doroteo Arango became Pancho Villa the outlaw.
From 1894 to 1910, Villa veered between banditry and legitimate work. Villa at times worked as a butcher, a miner, and a bricklayer.10 From looking at his life, it seems that Villa sought to legitimize his life many times, but his violent and impulsive nature, as well as outside influences, pushed Villa outside the bounds of respectability. Northern Mexico differed greatly from the agricultural setting in Morelos which spawned revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. Northern Mexico was cattle country, and dominated by the Terrazas-Creel clan. Villa became popular to many in northern Mexico because he rustled the cattle of the Terrazas-Creels. Villa was arrested for robbery in 1901 and sentenced to serve in the army. Deserting in 1902, he started a butcher shop in Hidalgo del Parral in Chihuahua, but the Terrazas monopoly muscled Villa out. Like many who later joined the Revolution, Villa joined not out of a national vision for Mexico, but because of frustration and anger over local injustices.11 There is little doubt that Villa committed crimes as an outlaw during the period from 1894 to 1910, but the economic and social context must always be considered.
In 1910, Porfirio Díaz announced that he would retire and not seek reelection. He was shocked when Francisco Madero took him seriously. Madero ran on a no-reelection campaign against Diaz, and the reality that the Porfiriato might end sparked the Mexican Revolution. The fires of revolution eventually burned all over Mexico. Not allied with Madero, Emiliano Zapata led peons in revolt for agrarian reform in the state of Morelos in the south. In 1910, Villa met with Abraham González, Madero's anti-electionist leader in Chihuahua. González must have viewed Villa as more than a bandit because he convinced Villa to join the Revolution. At the least, González and later Madero, understood that Villa could be an effective tool in promoting the overthrow of Diáz.12
Villa scholars have pointed out several motives for Villa joining the Revolution. Revenge against hacendado oppression provided a prime motive. Also, the Revolution gave Villa an opportunity for absolution for his past and a vehicle for legitimizing his future. Villa's background futher reveals another reason. Villa came from fighting stock. He solved problems astride a horse, a pistol in his hand. Also, Villa saw in men like Madero the avenue to a better future for Mexico. Barely literate, Villa always bemoaned his lack of education and sophistication. The Revolution offered Mexicans like Villa a chance at a better way of life.13
The revolt began in the north in Chihuahua. It is important to understand the difference between the struggle in the north and in the south. Whereas Zapata led mostly peons in revolt in the south, the revolt in northern Mexico contained people from every aspect of society. Lawyers, shop keepers, miners, federal army deserters, vaqueros, as well as peons, joined the struggle. Some fought against the local jefe políticios, local political bosses. Some joined to fight the hacendados. Some joined the revolt for the excitement. All were committed to the idea that Diáz was the source of all the problems and thus had to go.14 From these people, Villa gained his support.
Under the leadership of Pascual Orozco, Jr., Villa and the rebel guerillas inflicted great damage on the federalist forces of Diáz. By May 10, 1911, the rebel forces captured the border city of Ciudad Juárez. Diáz saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned. Yet the rejoicing over his departure would soon be replaced by more fighting. The Revolution, in reality, had just begun.15
The Revolution over, in his mind, Villa retired to Chihuahua City and opened a meat packing plant. The claim that Villa was simply a bandit cannot stand since he did not return to banditry, but tried to be a legitimate businessman. And while in the army, he did not seek to acquire a personal fortune, instead, he made sure that his men and their families were well compensated.16
Despite the lofty intentions, the coalition under Madero crumbled. Orozco grew dissatisfied and rebelled against Madero. Villa rejoined the fight to put down the rebellion against Madero. Villa served under the command of Victoriano Huerta. Huerta viewed Villa as a threat, and on a pretext, ordered Villa arrested and executed.17 Villa managed to escape and make it over the border to El Paso.
Men recognized, respected, and were drawn to the machismo and charisma of Villa. By March 1913, Villa formed an army of more than three thousand to take on Huerta and avenge Huerta's murder of Madero.18 Villa and his army of the North drove Huerta's forces out of successive towns. By late 1913, only three major cities in Chihuahua were left. Villa took Torreón on October 1, 1913. After a frontal assault of Chihuahua City was repulsed in November, Villa demonstrated his military ingenuity. Using a faked telegram, he snuck two thousand men in box cars into Ciudad Juárez later that month. The Trojan horse tactic worked and Villa took the city. The federal forces in Chihuahua City fled. In December, 1913, Villa entered Chihuahua City and proclaimed himself governor of Chihuahua. To the crowds, Villa became known as "the Centaur of the North" and "the Invincible General."19
It is during the two year term of Villa that one can see what he wished to accomplish. Villa did not seek to enrich himself at the expense of the people, instead he sought to bring reform to his native area. Villa expropriated the money, the land, and the cattle from the hacendados and paid his army. He set up pensions for his army widows and orphans. Villa organized a state bank. Well meaning but ignorantly, he printed his own money to just start the economy. He lowered the cost of basic necessities. He used his army to improve the infrastructure of Chihuahua (setting up phones, increasing electrification, improving water supply, and distributing food). Villa cared about children, especially orphans, and set up schools for their education.20 Katz pointed out that Villa certainly was not a nationalist. He did not desire to rule the country, only his own region. Villa wanted to return to the old days for northern Mexico, when this area was split up into military colonies. These times had been marked by a freedom of action and no central power.21
Yet this positive side of Villa must be balanced with his darker and common elements. Villa certainly was no democrat. In his own way, Villa proved as autocratic as Diáz. He tolerated no dissent, and if dissent came, he silenced it with a gun or knife. Villa intentionally overlooked the savagery of subordinates like Rodolfo Fierro. Fierro once sought to execute three hundred prisoners, ten at a time. Only one prisoner escaped, only because Fierro's trigger finger cramped.22
Villa's violence many times was impulsive and random. Emiliano Zapata, on the other hand, used violence in a purposive manner. Unlike Zapata who believed in agrarian reform for all of Morelos, Villa made sure his army got most of the benefits. He believed in giving land only to those who fought. Zapata gained a more committed following because he promised land for all. When Villa later encountered disastrous defeats, those peons he could have aided with land distribution, but did not, turned against him.23
Despite his military bravado and ingenuity, Villa lacked the intellectual and political sophistication to make lasting social changes. This was seen especially in his dealings with United States mining and railroad companies. Villa's popular and material support came from the northern states of Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Zacatecas, and Aguascalientes. The vast majority of Mexico's railroads, mines, and smelters were situated in these states. To the detriment of northern Mexicans, American companies owned seventy-eight percent of the mines. Villa depended on their largess for support and thus protected American interests in northern Mexico. U. S. companies subsidized Villa's military efforts, but refused to open the mines when metal prices dropped in 1913. While the closing of the mines increased the poverty of Mexicans in northern Mexico, Villa proved powerless to provoke the U. S. companies to reopen the mines. At their bequest, Villa prohibited strikes, and eventually gave in to every demand of the mining companies. Villa was out of his element and the American companies capitalized on this reality. Ironically, Villa fought for the Revolution but actually prevented revolutionary goals from being met in his native land. When Villa suffered several military setbacks in 1915, the American mining companies abandoned him.24 Political, economic, and military realities, as well as personal inadequacies, limited Villa's effectiveness as leader of Chihuahua between 1913 and 1915.
Villa's military fortunes began to sour as well after 1914. Villa was not the only northern leader to revolt against Huerta. In 1913, Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, and Alvaro Obregón, commander of the anti-government forces in Sonora, declared they would not support Huerta. Representatives from Villa, Carranza, and Obregón signed the Plan de Guadalupe, pledging their opposition to Huerta. The plan named Carranza as the "First Chief" of the Constitutional army and that he or another would become interim president after Huerta was ousted. Zapata never allied himself fully with the Constitutional forces, but he continue to fight Huerta's forces.25 Huerta abdicated in 1914. Carranza grew jealous over Villa making all the headlines for his military exploits. To make the rivalry even more heated, Carranza delayed sending coal that Villa needed for his trains in order to reach Mexico City. This allowed Obregón's forces to be the first to enter the capitol city after Huerta's departure. This enraged Villa. Even more inflammatory was the fact that Carranza did not invite Villa to the month long victory celebration in Mexico City.26
Carranza called for a constitutional meeting, and it took place at the neutral site of Aguascalientes. Villa and Carranza grew to hate and fear each other. Katz stated that the revolutionary forces split between the urban elites (led by Carranza) and the rural conventionalists (led by Zapata and Villa). Carranza feared barbarians like Villa and Zapata would take over. Villa and Zapata feared a Carranza dictatorship. Villa wanted a weak central government, Carranza wanted strong central government.27 Villa wanted Carranza to retire. Carranza wanted Villa and Zapata to disband. Neither happened. To Carranza's chagrin, the convention elected Eulalio Gutiérrez as interim president. On November 23, 1914, Carranza left Mexico City and set up a provisional government at Vera Cruz.28 With Obregón supporting Carranza, the stage was set for even more bloody and awful civil war. Villa's conventionalists and Carranza's constitutionalists declared war on each other.
Villa met his match in Obregón. Whereas Villa succeeded on bravado and ingenuity, Obregón used logic and strategy. Obregón picked the town of Celaya, over 100 miles northwest of Mexico as "the anvil on which to break Villa's back." Obregón had studied the tactics used in the ongoing war in Europe. He knew that Villa liked to used overwhelming cavalry charges. Obregón planned accordingly. He used staggered trenches, interlocking fields of machine gun fire, and tight strands of barbed wire. He also held back his calvary for a murderous counter-attack. Villa rejected the advice of his top military adviser Felipe Ángeles, and on April 6, 1915, made a frontal assault. In three battles Obregón totally annihilated Villa's army. 29 The ruinous defeats by Obregón started Villa's decline as a national power.
The disastrous defeats by Obregón turned U. S. sentiment against him as well. Once the darling of the American press, the feature of an American movie, and the recipient of arms and monies by U. S. companies, Villa was relegated to the level of outlaw once again. The Mexican Revolution had brought collateral damage to American border towns. Roving Mexican bandits had attacked U. S. targets. President Woodrow Wilson, despite his distaste for the nationalistic Carranza, thought that the Carranza government would bring more control and safety to the U. S. border. 30 The United States also worried that Germany would use the unrest in Mexico to tie America down and prevent it from getting involved in the war in Europe. Historian James Sandos has given evidence that German subversives sought to prompt Villa to attack the United States.31 On October 19, 1915, the Wilson administration recognized the Carranza government. To Villa's outrage, Wilson allowed Carranza's forces to cross into the United States and travel to the town of Agua Prieta. The battle lasted from November 1 to November 3, 1915. Obregón's forces, led by Plutarcho Calles, further devastated Villa's forces. Villa was convinced that the Americans provided the spotlights that outlined Villa's men in the dark and thus made them easy targets for Calles' army.32 The defeats by Obregón and Calles forced Villa to take up the guerilla lifestyle he had lived before 1913.
One historian compared Villa's personality and impact to that of a blind and destructive tornado. Others argue that he was like a wild animal. 33 Despite the desertion of the United States and the terrible military defeats, Villa still possessed the will to fight. A wounded animal, backed into a corner, becomes much more dangerous to its foes. Villa considered loyalty preeminent, and his memory docketed the smallest slight. If possible, he always wreaked his revenge.34 By early 1916, relegated once again to outlaw status and feeling betrayed, he turned his wrath on his once great benefactor and now Judas, the United States.
To this day, historians grapple with Villa's motivations for attacking Columbus, New Mexico on March 9, 1916. The attack left seventeen Americans dead. The most obvious reason that for Villa's attack was the desire for personal revenge.35 Friedrich Katz took a different tack and argued that Villa's primary reason for the attack was that he feared that Carranza was selling out Mexico to the United States. Villa wanted to disrupt relations between Mexico and the United States, cripple Carranza, punish the United States, and rally Mexicans to a nationalistic fervor.36 Both political and personal reasons played a part in Villa's actions.37
Villa's efforts, while garnering him more local support, actually helped to further weaken his own cause. Wilson ordered the Punitive Expedition, and military units led by John J. Pershing launched out into to Mexico to either find Villa or at least inflict heavy damage on his forces. While the U. S. expended great effort to find Villa, he remained elusive. Some consider the Punitive Expedition as a complete failure.38 Yet the United States did inflict great damage on Villa's forces. American forces killed over 400 Villistas and forced Villa's army to scatter. Many of Villa's generals and colonels were either captured or killed. Carranza's anger over the U. S. intervention, as well the growing demands of the European war, convinced Wilson to withdraw the American forces. It would seem that Villa survived more by the effect of outside forces than his own initiative.39
To many American's and Mexican's surprise and disappointment, Villa continued to fight on after the American forces left Mexico. Between late 1916 and 1920, he continued to raid cities and haciendas to stay afloat. Katz argued in his massive work on Villa that the once great general suffered from a moral decline in the last years of his military career. Whereas before many joined Villa voluntarily, in these latter years he forcibly took conscripts from the villages he traversed through. He allowed his men to slaughter, pillage, and rape in some of the areas that once supported him. Many Chihuahuans, tired of the war, sided with Carranza.40
Villa held out until his old nemesis Carranza was deposed. An old comrade, Adolfo de la Huerta, came to power in 1920. Tired of fighting, Villa agreed to peace. Despite initial misgivings, even his old military foe, Alvaro Obregón agreed to leave Villa in peace.41 Villa was given a 25,000 acre hacienda named Canutillo in Durango. Some historians like Henry Bamford Parkes have said that Villa eventually succumbed to the lure of money and allowed himself to be bribed into peace.42 Its true that Villa became a large and prosperous hacienda owner, but Katz pointed out that this military like outpost guaranteed his survival against the myriads of enemies he had made over the years. Yet unlike other hacendados who did nothing for his peons, Villa built a school that educated over 300 students from his own haciendas as well as children from the surrounding ranches.43
Violence many times recoils on the violent. Villa remained content to run his hacienda for three years, but by 1923 he suffered the same violent end as Madero, Carranza, Zapata, and later Obregón. Villa died in a hail of bullets while driving his car in Perral in 1923. Villa had made rumblings that he would support de la Huerta against the Sonorans (Obregón and Calles). Many historians including Friedrich Katz have argued that Obregón and Calles organized his execution.44 Others have said the assassination of Villa concerned personal disputes more than political ones.45 Whatever the cause, the man Pancho Villa died in 1923, but the legend lives on.
Trying to evaluate the life and motivations of Pancho Villa in a few pages is like trying to corral a tornado. The text and notes of Friedrich Katz's massive biography of Villa numbers over 900 pages alone. If a phrase can capture Villa, it would be "extreme contradiction." Francisco "Pancho" Villa was a man of extremes. He suffered from deep emotional depressions, yet he could laugh easily. He felt great compassion for children, yet he could kill those he deemed enemies without mercy. He demanded loyalty from all of his men but trusted few of them. He amassed great amounts of property and cash through his raids, yet he did not desire personal fortune, spending a large amount on his soldiers and their families. He conducted numerous sexual affairs, yet he abstained from alcohol and cigarettes. To some he proved an avenger of the poor, a Mexican Robin Hood. To others Villa's exploits made him a bloodthirsty bandit. Yet his life must be seen against the backdrop of the violence of the times. Villa and his men killed many people, but he and his followers certainly were not the only hands stained with blood. The lasting irony concerning Villa is that he is considered a hero revolution. Yet once in power, he ruled like the hacendados and politicians he hated.
Because of his intellectual and educational shortcomings, as well as his authoritarian nature, Pancho Villa was not the man who could have led average Mexicans to a better life, but he did help dismantle the hacendado system and the old regime.46 With all of his faults and shortcomings, he helped pave the way for a better Mexico.
1. Clarence C. Clendenen,
The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 8-10.
2. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit . (New York: Random House, 1970), 27.
3. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969, 3rd edition), 305.
4. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata: A History of the Mexican Revolution. (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000, 2001), 58.
5. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 805.
6. Ibid. , 794, 799, 805.
7. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power; A History of Modern Mexico. (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 307.
8. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 800.
9. Ibid. , 805; Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, 10.
10. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 60.
11. Ibid. , 60, 63; Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 806.
12. Ibid. , 103.
13. Ibid. , 73-74; Haldeen Braddy, Cock of the Walk: The Legend of Pancho Villa. (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970), 90; Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 69
Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 308, 317, 319.
14. Michael C. Myer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, The Course of Mexican History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 7th edition), 480.
15. Ibid. , 483-485.
16. Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, 316.
17. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 141-142.
18. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 39; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 338.
19. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 39-40.
20. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 315.
21. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 808-809.
22. Ibid. , 809; Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 318.
23. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 709, 808.
24. William K. Myers, "Pancho Villa and the Multinationals: United States Mining Interests in Villista Mexico, 1913-1915," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (May 1991): 339-363.
25. Michael C. Myers, et als., The Course of Mexican History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 7th edition), 503.
26. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 52.
27. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 810-811.
28. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 54.
29. Ibid. , 55-57.
30. James A Sandos, "Pancho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy Reconsidered," Journal of Latin American Studies 13 (November 1981), 298.
31. Louis G. Kahle, "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Vensustiano Carranza," The Hispanic American Historical Review, (August 1958), 353, 362; See James A. Sandos, "German Involvement in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus Raid," The Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (February 1970), 70-88.
32. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 61-62; Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 326-328.
33. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 341; Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 188.
34. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 328.
35. Ibid. , 328; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 356.
36. Friedrich Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico," The American Historical Review 83 (February 1978), 116, 125-126.
37. Frank McLynn, Villa and Zapata, 319-320.
38. Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power, 329-330.
39. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 231; James A. Sandos, "Pancho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy Reconsidered," 302-303; Clarence Clendenden, The United States and Pancho Villa, 317-318.
40. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 623-624, 634-635, 709, 811.
41. Herbert Malloy Mason, The Great Pursuit , 237.
42. Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 367.
43. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 733, 811.
44. Ibid. , 780; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico, 366; Joseph A. Stout, Jr., Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915-1920, (Fort Worth, Texas: Texas Christian University, 1999), 142.
45. Herbert Malloy Mason, Jr., The Great Pursuit , 237-238.
46. Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, 817
Braddy, Haldeen. Cock of the Walk: The Legend of Pancho Villa. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970.
________. "Pancho Villa at Columbus: The Raid of 1916. " Southwestern Studies 3 (Spring 1965): 1-41.
Clendenen, Clarence C. The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press: 1961.
Kahle, Louis G. "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza." The Hispanic American Historical Review 38 (August 1958): 353-372.
Katz, Friedrich. "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico." The American Historical Review 83 (February 1978): 101-130.
________. The Life and Times of Pancho Villa. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: A Biography of Power; A History of Modern Mexico. New York: Harper Collins, 1997.
Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr. The Great Pursuit . New York: Random House, 1970.
McLynn, Frank. Villa and Zapata: A History of the Mexican Revolution. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000, 2001.
Myer, Michael C., and William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds. The Course of Mexican History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 7th edition.
Myers, William K. "Pancho Villa and the Multinationals: United States Mining Interests in Villista Mexico, 1913-1915." Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (May 1991): 339-363.
Parkes, Henry Bamford. A History of Mexico. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 3rd edition.
Sandos, James A. "German Involvement in Northern Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus Raid." The Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (February 1970): 70-88.
________. "Pancho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy Reconsidered." Journal of Latin American Studies 13 (November 1981): 293-311.
Stout, Joseph Allen. Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915-1920. Fort Worth, Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1999.