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by Donald J. Mabry
October 21, 1988
The illicit drug appetite of U.S. citizens and their government's efforts to cut off the supply of those drugs threaten the national security of many Latin American nations and of the United States itself. U.S. citizens annually consume an estimated 6-7 metric tons of heroin, 75-100 metric tons of cocaine, and 7,000-12,000 metric tons of marijuana. All of the cocaine and most of the heroin and marijuana comes from Latin America. To meet the U.S. demand for illicit drugs, Mexican entrepreneurs annually produce 45-55 metric tons of heroin, South American entrepreneurs produce 322-418 metric tons of cocaine, and entrepreneurs in a number of Latin American countries produce an estimated 11,000 metric tons of marijuana.(1) In addition, entrepreneurs in transit nations such as The Bahamas, Honduras, and Panama provide transportation and financial services. To conduct this illegal business, drug traffickers must defy and circumvent the laws of their own nations, international law, and the laws of the United States. The United States, for its part, has declared international drug trafficking a national security issue for the United States and has attacked the trade through eradication and interdiction programs. Both the drug producing-trafficking nexus and U.S. international drug policy have threatened the political and economic stability of Latin American nations and, to a much lesser degree, that of the United States itself.
National Security and Drug Trafficking
National security includes the political, social, and economic health of a society, not just such issues as armaments, military readiness, and espionage. Chronic political instability fosters both domestic revolutionary movements and foreign intervention and hinders economic development. Economic health is important for the very survival of the nation; a weak economy not only means that the population suffers but also that the State does not have the resources necessary to govern effectively. In such circumstances, the State has difficulty creating the conditions for or directly promoting economic development, for providing the citizenry with basic personal security, and for maintaining public forces adequate to the defense of the nation.
Illicit narcotics production and trafficking threatens the national security of every country in which it takes place. To operate, drug traffickers must neutralize government officials by intimidating, corrupting, or even killing them. Both corruption and murder of government officials mock the rule of law and destabilize a nation, as recent events in Colombia have demonstrated. National governments are losing effective control of the Chapare and Beni regions in Bolivia and the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru. Colombian drug lords not only dominate parts of Colombia's Caqueta, Meta, and Guaviare states but also Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley. When this occurs, there are two states--the official one and the one ruled by the drug traffickers. In Panama and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras and Paraguay, the military has been corrupted by involvement in drug trafficking. Corrupt societies are inherently less secure, for corruption weakens the ability of the State to carry out one of its fundamental duties, that of providing public order and basic personal security to its citizens. Large-scale drug smuggling punches holes in the national borders, opening gaps through which all manner of personnel and goods can pour.
More complex as a national security issue for Western Hemispheric nations are the prospect of narcoterrorism, linkages between drug traffickers and terrorist/guerrilla movements or the latter directly engaging in drug trafficking. In the Andean nations, left-wing terrorists and drug producers and traffickers have allied in certain instances, usually with the terrorists acting as a protective military arm for the narcomafia. Examples are the M-19 and FARC in Colombia. Drug traffickers have also paid terrorists in weaponry, transporting the weapons on return trips from carrying drugs into the United States. This appears to be the case in Mexico where Mexican security forces captured 360 Soviet-designed AK47 assault rifles, ammunition, airplanes, and other vehicles in March, 1988 during raids on drug rings in Agua Prieta, Hermosillo, and Durango.(2)
The potential threat of narcoterrorism is unclear, however, for there is a basic ideological and economic conflict of interest between left-wing terrorists and drug traffickers.(3) The latter want a capitalist state, one in which profits are valued. They are themselves quintessential capitalists with "free enterprise" capitalist values. Their dispute with their existing government is its interference with their business activities. Most terrorists, on the other hand, ideologically identify themselves with the Left, opposing capitalism and seeking to replace it with some form of non-democratic socialism. There is some evidence that left-wing terrorists have entered the business directly of illicit drug production and transportation to the marketplace. In contrast,there seems to be little evidence that such left-wing terrorists in Latin America are engaged in marketing.
Drug traffickers are a more serious national security threat than are narcoterrorists. They create or use right-wing groups which engage in terrorist acts. These groups threaten, beat, and murder government officials or others who get in their way. In Colombia, drug traffickers have hired thugs to terrorize the judicial system into neutrality. In addition, some have gotten marginally involved in politics, usually by giving financial support to political candidates. Some, such as Carlos Lehder, have even organized their own right-wing political movements. This terrorism is essentially different from terrorist movements which seek to overthrow the state inasmuch as the goal is to intimidate the state into adopting a laissez-faire policy towards the drug business. In terms of being a threat to the rule of law, democracy, and political stability, however, the immediate results of both types of terrorism are similar.
Even though drug trafficking is a national security threat to nations in which it takes place, it also has economic benefits, making it difficult to end. It is an important source of personal income and tax revenue. No one knows how much money is earned from the drug trade; clandestine activities are difficult to assess. One expert estimates that South American cocaine traffickers earn some $3-5 billion annually, the bulk of which is stashed abroad. For Colombia, cocaine exports equal 4-12% of legal exports; for Peru, 23-27%, and for Bolivia, 53-95%. Such export earnings are critical for Bolivia and Peru and not insignificant for Colombia where they equal coffee exports. Governments of these nations encourage repatriation of drug money by such devices as tax amnesties. In Bolivia and Peru, peasant coca growers are organized to protect their interests and intimidate the government when it tries to eradicate their crops. These nations have very serious unemployment problems, and coca growing and cocaine manufacturing employ hundreds of thousands. The estimated 400,000 people involved in coca production in Bolivia represent an important portion of the nation's total 6.5 million people.(4)
Drug money is a mixed economic blessing, however. Traffickers stash much of it in tax havens such as Panama and the Cayman Islands and most of what does return to the trafficker's home country is used for conspicuous consumption, often for foreign-made luxury items, and not invested in ways which would produce sustained economic growth. Bolivia has clearly become dependent upon drug money for its economic survival; Peru's dependency is increasing. Even Colombia and Mexico, with stronger, more balanced economies, feel the effects of fluctuations in the international drug market. In other words, dependence upon drug money is another form of economic dependency with all its well-known ill effects, including instability.
The United States and Drugs
On the United States side, the drug trade also has deleterious effects. Because the use of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana are illegal, millions are daily disobeying national and state laws. Cocaine users are estimated to number 6 million and marijuana users about 18 million. Heroin addicts number approximately 500,000, a small percentage of the total population. Because these drugs are illegal, their price is high. Some 90% of the profit from the trade is earned inside the United States by criminals and criminal organizations. To pay these prices, some users engage in robbery and violence. The rise of street violence and urban gangs is directly related to the drug business. U.S. jails and prisons are filling up with drug traffickers. A large percentage of those imprisoned have been convicted of drug-related crimes. The trade requires the cooperation of government officials and drug corruption is extensive, aiding in the undermining of government and its law enforcement activities. Drug abuse also costs society in terms of lower worker productivity, additional health care, and lost income; in 1983, these social costs were estimated to be $59.7 billion. The amounts spent on illicit drugs, lost income, and necessary law enforcement are monies which might have been spent to improve economic production and the quality of life. The ease with which drugs are smuggled across the national borders reveals the relative inability of the United States to prevent any smuggling of any kind, whether it be commodities into the United States or strategic materials and information out of the country.(5)
To the extent that the drug business corrupts Latin American governments, it is a national security threat to the United States. The U.S. does not want drug-corrupted governments on its southern flank. Governments intimidated by drug barons are unreliable allies. Political stability has been a consistent U.S. foreign policy goal regarding Latin America. The U.S. prefers to concentrate its attention on Europe and Asia, where there are military threats. Terrorist/guerrilla movements can exploit the drug business to gain money and weaponry to establish anti-U.S. governments. Some groups, such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, have tried to recruit peasants to their cause by pointing out that crop eradication programs are U.S.-inspired.
Even though the Latin American drug trade is a Hemispheric problem, the United States has approached it unilaterally. The U.S. has concentrated its efforts on attacking the supply side in Latin America instead of seeking to reduce demand in the U.S. This supply side approach not only avoids domestic political repercussions but also allows both citizens and the government of the United States to avoid responsibility for the problem. Such an approach has a long history, one in which xenophobia and racism have played a major role. Before World War II, the U.S. sought to reduce supply through treaties; in recent decades, the U.S. has funded crop eradication in Latin America and elsewhere and beefed up interdiction programs. Further, in a controversial move, it has sought to extradite drug lords for crimes committed outside U.S. territory. Carlos Lehder of Colombia was extradited and then convicted in a Jacksonville, Florida federal court and the U.S. is currently trying to extradite Colonel Jean-Claude Paul of Haiti. At times, it apparently kidnaps drug traffickers as it did to Juan Ramn Matta Ballesteros of Honduras. All of these measures have exacerbated tensions, since many Latin Americans see them as further proof that the United States has scant respect for national sovereignty or Latin American problems(6).
To encourage (or coerce, depending upon the viewpoint) source and transit nations to cooperate with the United States anti-drug efforts, Congress has mandated a certification program.(7) Under its terms, the President of the United States is required by law each year to "determine and certify" whether major narcotics source and transit nations have "cooperated fully" with the United States, whether they have taken adequate steps in tandem with the United States or by themselves to control narcotics production, trafficking and money laundering.
If the President does not certify a nation, it can lose foreign aid and access to U.S. markets as well as face negative U.S. votes in international lending agencies. The President can, however, certify an uncooperative nation on the grounds of national security interests, something which has been done with Pakistan, one of the world's largest heroin producers. In practice, therefore, the only nations which have been decertified are those with whom the U.S. has little influence: Iran, Panama, Syria, and Afghanistan. For many Latin Americans, the certification program is simply another bullying tactic of the U.S.(8)
The certification program and U.S. narcotics foreign policy is a nationalistic and nativistic response to the problem, reminiscent of the trade embargoes the U.S. has unsuccessfully used since the first decade of the nineteenth century and of Big Stick diplomacy.(9) Certainly many Latin American nations see it as such. Mexicans were furious when the Senate proposed decertifying Mexico. Their anger was particularly fierce since Mexico has been one of the most cooperative nations on this issue. Numerous Mexicans have died fighting the drug business inside Mexico and over half of the national attorney general's budget is dedicated to the anti-drug effort even though Mexico has no serious heroin, cocaine, or marijuana problem. Colombia, under pressure not just from its drug lords but also from nationalists, has effectively invalidated its 1979 extradition treaty with the U.S.(10)
A key but controversial element in U.S. anti-drug strategy in Latin America is crop eradication, for it touches the sensitive nerve of national sovereignty. The United States funds eradication programs in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The actual work is done by locals but with the on-site advice of Drug Enforcement Administration officials. In Mexico, eradication is done primarily through aerial spraying, but soldiers also eradicate. Eradication of the coca bush in the Andes, however, has required hand labor for it is resistant to herbicides. In 1988, Peru and the United States agreed to try the herbicide "Spike", but the efforts fell through when the manufacturer, Eli Lilly Company, refused to sell the poison without guarantees of prior indemnification from the U.S. government. In 1986, U.S. military personnel and equipment conducted Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia, an effort which terminated cocaine production for three months but also almost toppled the government. As David Westrate of DEA has pointed out, such an effort cannot be mounted again. Nationalists will not tolerate it.(11)
Eradication is a difficult policy not just because nationalists oppose it. Coca, opium (the raw material for heroin), and marijuana pay much more than traditional crops and their destruction threatens the very livelihood of peasant growers. In Bolivia and Peru, growing coca for the domestic market (based on the ancient tradition of chewing the coca leaf) is legal and both nations are reluctant to stop this practice. Moreover, growers for the illicit international market have joined grower confederations and used this political muscle to block eradication campaigns. When fields are eradicated, new ones are planted elsewhere; coca cultivation has spread from Bolivia and Peru into Brazil and Colombia. Marijuana eradication is even more difficult since it can be grown almost everywhere in the hemisphere. Opium eradication programs in Mexico, the only place where it is grown, have had more success but even there growers have dispersed their fields throughout the republic.(12)
Eradication in Latin America would work only if there were multinational efforts combined with crop substitution and other income replacement schemes. Eradication could be successful if producing nations decided it was in their self-interest to do it but will not work as long as it is perceived as a U.S.-imposed decision even though drug traffickers are destabilizing these nations.(13) Latin American nations may move towards more eradication efforts because there is evidence of rising drug use there. Reports emanating from Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia indicate that drug use is rising, including among pre-teens, as coca prices drop because of overproduction. Cheaper cocaine apparently is also drawing more Colombians and Mexicans into drug usage. As drug usage seeps into the middle and upper classes, it is likely that anti-drug programs will increase in number and strength.(14)
U.S.-Latin American relations aside, the fundamental problem with the U.S. policy of attacking the supply side of the Latin American drug trade is that it has not worked. Eradication of marijuana, coca, and opium fields has not reduced supply. If supply is significantly reduced, street prices would rise. They have not. In fact, street prices have dropped. The drug trade is so profitable that new fields are brought into cultivation faster than eradication has taken place. Similarly, interdiction efforts have also failed, for extraordinary profits and low risk of capture continually entice smugglers. Cocaine, with its high dollar value per unit of weight, can be smuggled in a variety of different and, presently, undetectable ways, including being hidden inside cargo containers.(15) Frustration with the failure of current interdiction efforts encouraged many in the U.S. Congress to advocate giving the interdiction job to the military.(16)
Certification, eradication, interdiction, and extradition programs directed at Latin America will yield meager results as long as demand for illicit drugs continues at a high level inside the U.S. Demand is likely to continue to be strong, for the use of illegal narcotics is part of a larger social phenomenon, the belief held by many Americans that they are entitled to "feel good" instantly. The narcotics problem is directly related to the same factors which produce abuse of legal narcotics, tobacco, alcohol tranquilizers, designer drugs, and other substances. It is also related to the belief that one can break some laws because these illegal actions hurt only themselves. The nation must recognize that the use of narcotics is a longterm problem. Historians H. Wayne Morgan and David Musto aptly demonstrate this point. There is no immediate solution, "no quick-fix." (17)
U.S.-Latin American Relations
The drug issue is important, but is it really as important an issue in United States-Latin American relations as the international debt crisis and the decline of real income in Latin America? Narcotics usage in the U.S. and narcotics-related violence in the streets and homes of the U.S. is more visible to the average U.S. citizen than are the debt crisis and the devastating price paid in human terms by Latin American citizens as their economies decline. In Hemispheric relations, however, they are not as important. The collapse of the Mexican economy, for example, would have much more serious effects on the U.S. and on Mexico, the third largest trading partner of the United States and a nation which shares a 2,000-mile border. Antagonizing Latin American nations on the drug issue is counterproductive, especially when there are more serious problems facing the Hemisphere which require close cooperation. The U.S. can make Latin America "safer for democracy" by granting more favorable terms of trade and by easing the debt burden. The drug issue is not the most important issue separating the U.S. and Latin America but it is the most volatile, emotional, and disruptive and takes an inordinate amount of time and attention away from the more serious problems.
In its relations with Latin America, the United States faces circumstances dramatically different from that of the past. The United States can no longer impose its will on the hemisphere, at least not without adverse consequences. Nationalists will not tolerate it and no Latin American government can ignore the mass mobilization of nationalist sentiment. Latin American nations are stronger than they once were vis-a-vis the United States and can also exploit the competitiveness within the international arena. Finally, the very existence of Cuba and Nicaragua outside the U.S. orbit encourages more independent action. Mexico, in spite of its economic crisis, is healthier politically and economically than the Andean nations, yet it is debating whether to continue to spend 60% of its national attorney general's budget on the drug wars. The demands for a more active anti-drug campaign threatens to destabilize Andean countries, certainly a policy output not desired by the U.S.
Nations such as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru have scant resources with which to address serious economic and social problems. No responsible political leader in these nations wants an economy based on narcotics nor a polity divided against itself. None want to return to a version of nineteenth century caudillismo wherein local strongmen with private armies could block the national government from enforcing its laws in their private domains. Politicians in these nations recognize the dangers from such a situation just as they recognize the dangers of their people turning to narcotics as a means of escape. Money spent on narcotics or spent to indulge the whims of traffickers does little to develop the national economy. Latin American nations do not want the drug problem which the United States faces. But they can do little to combat drugs and the local effects of drug trafficking without additional resources and without some means by which to replace lost income. The United States is the only real source of those additional resources and one which justly should help since its citizens helped create the problem.
The US policy of attacking illegal narcotics at their source should be multilateral in scope, for the problem requires a multilateral solution. In the second half of 1988, the U.S. has taken steps to turn its unilateral policy into a multilateral one. Drug Enforcement Administration officials, many of whom work with their counterparts inside Latin American nations, recognized this fact of life long before politicians did. The U.S. is fond of talking about Hemispheric cooperation but reluctant to practice it. The narcotics issue may be a case where the U.S. government will work as a partner with source and transit nations instead of acting as their overseer. The U.S. needs to help producer and transit nations attack the problem by supplying greater fiscal and training resources so that source and transit country governments can better tackle their domestic problem.
The U.S. has worsened its relations with Latin America by injecting an American social problem into the international arena and trying to solve it there, where it cannot be solved, instead of at home, where it should be solved. This is the point of those who emphasize the demand side of the problem; there would be no supply if there were no demand. The United States has the means to attack production and distribution systems inside the United States. By eliminating American criminal organizations, it can attack 90% of the total profits made in the drug business. The nation has a vast array of laws which can be enforced and can enact new ones. The U.S. must decide which is more important--stable, pro-U.S. Latin American nations or an international narcotics policy which engenders anti-US nationalistic sentiment and destabilizes Latin American nations. (18)
The certification program needs to be closely re-examined. The use of the word "certification" is offensive to other countries, for they tend to see it as a moral judgment being passed on them by the United States. No nation (and no person, for that matter) wants someone else publicly passing judgment on it. Compounding the controversy is the fact that the United States certifies major drug-producing nations such as Pakistan, which are not making strenuous efforts to eradicate drug-producing fields, because the U.S. sees these nations as too important strategically. The United States sends a clear message to Latin American nations that they are less important in spite of the strategic importance of many Latin American nations and the vast profits these nations produce for U.S. corporations.
The U.S. would be better served by offering incentives to producing and transit nations. Threats produce defensiveness. Although the United States may have the power to coerce nations such as Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Panama, Honduras, and Colombia, the cost of that coercion may be greater than the payoff. The unsuccessful U.S. efforts to oust Panamanian General Manuel Noriega demonstrate the dangers of using coercion. Bolivia and Peru, for example, would certainly respond to crop substitution programs, aid to their own police forces, the purchase of more of their exports, and aid in resolving their massive debt problems.
Latin Americans, like other peoples, do not like hypocrisy practiced on them and many believe that is what the U.S. is doing in the drug war. Many Latin Americans are demanding that the United States, itself a major drug producer, spray herbicides on its own territory just as it insists be done in Latin America. They want the U.S. to test "Spike," with its unknown environmental dangers, on U.S. agricultural and range land before encouraging its application on coca fields in South America. They suggest that, if the U.S. government is going to use certification procedures, it apply them to its own states. For example, the U.S. government could withhold federal aid to states which do not meet federal standards for the eradication of marijuana crops, for the prosecution of drug traffickers, or for identifying and prosecuting corrupt public officials in league with drug traffickers. If the U.S. uses certification procedures in dealing with other nations, it should use them with all other nations and quit making exceptions of such places as Pakistan.
The Latin American drug trade has very serious national security implications for the hemisphere for it destabilizes nations, distorts economies, and exacerbates Hemispheric tensions while diverting attention from the more critical problems of underdevelopment. U.S. narcotics foreign policy has succeeded in worsening U.S.-Latin American relations while failing to stop the drug trade. The chief beneficiaries of this policy have been the drug traffickers themselves, who are able to charge higher prices because of the risks involved and when eradication reduces supply, and the law enforcement agencies, which have gained resources. Although a multilateral approach to supply reduction portends more success, ultimately the solution resides inside the United States. The drug trade will continue as long as U.S. citizens desire illicit drugs, and their appetite will continue to hurt source and transit nations.
1. Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, Federal Drug Abuse Control Policy and the Role of the Military in Anti-Drug Efforts. GAO/T-GGD-88-38 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988). Estimates of heroin production elsewhere are 735-1,360 tons for Southwest Asia and 1,095-1,575 metric tons for Southeast Asia but Mexico is the principal source for U.S. heroin consumption. On marijuana, see Roger Warner, Invisible Hand: The Marijuana Business. (New York: Beech Tree Books, 1986) and Jerry Kamstra, Weed: Adventures of a Dope Smuggler. (New York: Bantam, 1975). U.S. domestic production may equal 25% of the world total.
2. See Rensselaer W. Lee III,"Why The U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine," Orbis, 32:4 (Fall 1988), 499-519; Bruce Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs, 67:1 (Fall 1988), 72-63 ; Diego Asencio, "Narcotics Trafficking and Western Hemisphere Security," paper presented at conference on The Latin American Narcotics Trade and United States National Security, June 15-16,1988, sponsored by the Center for International Security and Strategic Studies, Mississippi State University. On Mexico, see William Branigan, "The Mexican Connection," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, March 14-20, 1988, 7.
3. Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Why The U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine," 506-512.
4. Lee, "Why the U.S. Cannot Win The Drug War," 502-506.
5. Frank H. Gawin and Everett H. Ellinwood, "Cocaine and Other Stimulants:Action, Abuse, and Treatment," New England Journal of Medicine, 318 (May 5, 1988), 1173; Eliot Marshal, "Flying Blind in the War on Drugs," Science, 240 (June 17, 1988), 1606; General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 14
6. On the history of U.S. international narcotics policy before World War II, see Arnold H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969); on the post-war period, see William O. Walker, III, Drug Trade in the Americas. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981).
7. The terms of the certification program can be found in Congressional Research Service, International Narcotics Control and Foreign Assistance Certification: Requirements, Procedures, Timetables and Guidelines. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988). Certification is not directed just at the source and transit nations in Latin America and elsewhere but also at the Executive Branch to insure it executes the laws. It is also one way the Congress conducts U.S. foreign policy.
8. Raphael F. Perl, International Narcotics Control: The President's March 1, 1988 Certification for Foreign Assistance Eligibility and Options for Congressional Action (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1988).
9. Walker, III, Drug Trade in the Americas.
10. Mexican government views can be found in "Intimidating Pressure Tactics," Mexico Today, 47 (October 1986), 1-3, and "The Real Nature of Drug Trafficking," Mexico Today, 49 (December 1986), 10-11. See also Samuel I. del Villar,"Rethinking Hemispheric Antinarcotics Strategy and Security," and Jos Luis Reyna,"Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for Source and Non-Source Countries;" both papers were presented to the conference on The Latin American Narcotics Trade and United States National Security, June 15-16,1988, sponsored by the Center for International Security and Strategic Studies, Mississippi State University. For Colombia, see Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," 87.
11. Raphael Perl, "Narcotics Control and the Use of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for Congress," Report No. 86-800 F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1986; David Westrate in Congressional Research Service, Narcotics Interdiction and the Use of the Military: Issues for Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988),7.
12. On coca, see Tim Hudson, "South American High: A Geography of Cocaine," Focus (January 1985), 22-29, and Lee, "Why The U.S. Cannot Stop South American Cocaine". For Mexico, see the following articles by Richard B. Craig, "Human Rights and Mexico's Antidrug Campaign," Social Science Quarterly, 60 (1980), 691-701; "Operacn Intercepcin: una poltica de presin internacional," Foro Internacional, 22 (1981), 203-230; "Operation Condor: Mexico's Antidrug Campaign Enters a New Era," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 22 (1980),345-363; "Illegal Drug Traffic," in Borderlands Sourcebook: A Guide to the Literature of Northern Mexico and the American Southwest, 209-213, eds. E.R. Stoddard, R. L. Nostrand, and J.P. West. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1983; and "La Campaa Permanente: Mexico's Antidrug Campaign," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 20 (1978),107-131.
13. This excellent point was made by Richard B. Craig during the Closing Roundtable of the conference on The Latin American Narcotics Trade and United States National Security, June 15-16,1988, sponsored by the Center for International Security and Strategic Studies, Mississippi State University.
14. Clara Germani," Coca Addiction Hits Home -- Among Rural Children of Drug-Producing Bolivia," The Christian Science Monitor International Edition, September 29, 1988, 1, 28; Clara Germani, "View From the Barrio in Peru's Drug War," The Christian Science Monitor International Edition, September 29, 1988, 28.
15. See Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction (Washington: Rand Corporation, 1988).
16. See Donald J. Mabry, "The U.S. Military and The War on Drugs in Latin America," paper presented to the George Washington University-Wilson Center Conference on the Latin America Drug Trade, September 30, 1988.
17. H. Wayne Morgan, Drugs in America: A Social History, 1800-1980. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981); see also David Musto, The American Disease: The Origins of Narcotic Control, expanded edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
18. See Reuter, Sealing the Borders.